

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY China

SUBJECT Military Information: Communist Capabilities
and Intentions in North China and Manchuria

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1. The Communists in Manchuria are now regrouping and re-establishing their communications. Spring and summer mud will probably but not certainly prevent any massive concentrations or drives on the plains. The Nationalist strength in the Chinchou area is probably sufficient to keep the Communists out of the coastal corridor. The Nationalist materiel and morale in Mukden now are probably adequate to resist any assault of which the Communists are capable.

If the Communists take the offensive this summer, they may possibly move south, bypassing Mukden and Chinchou. One possible line of advance is through Jehol and Inner Mongolia, where the ground conditions are favorable for movement. Jehol is lightly garrisoned by the Nationalists, and their harsh treatment of the Inner Mongols is driving the Mongols to affiliate with the Wangyehmiao (122-01, 46-05) regime.

Note: Wangyehmiao is now known as Huhe Bator, and is the capital of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government. Thus the Communists have complete freedom to maneuver and concentrate to the north of FU Tso-yi's northern defenses. The brunt of the offensive would fall on FU's armies with Mukden unable to create a diversion and Ninghsia (106-19, 38-28) capable of only slight assistance. FU is probably able to conduct a protracted defense of the Peiping-Tientsin-Paoing triangle but it seems doubtful that he could hold Chahar and Suiyuan at the same time. However, unknown factors in the possible weight of the Communist drive from the north, and their ability to concentrate forces from the adjacent provinces for an attack on his rear, make a prediction on the duration of his defense highly speculative.

3. The second possible line for the Communist move south is by water lift to Shantung, which would be possible for small cadres with some materiel. The fall of Weihsien clears the Nationalists from central Shantung, where the Communists can now concentrate their forces unmolested and move either against Tsinan, FU Tso-yi's rear, or northern Kiangsu. The latter area is defended by KU Chu-tung who is considered incompetent.
4. The Nationalists have now depleted their strategic reserves in garrison duty, and they are unable to muster a significant striking force for offensive operations without abandoning garrisoned points. The abandonment is impossible for political

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reasons. Therefore the Communists have the leisure to recruit, train and concentrate troops in the countryside. By continued light pressure against garrisoned areas and lines of communication they can gradually deplete the Nationalist strength through attrition. At present, they isolate and then assault and reduce only the weakest points in the Nationalist hands. The Nationalist units are virtually all undermanned; the replacement program is not working and the morale of the field officers is very low. The Nationalists are suffering an overall political and economic deterioration with no potential or stabilizing factors in sight.

5. The Communists are now gaining a very economical victory in the civil war. The only reason for the Communists to abandon the present strategy in favor of large-scale formal offensive operations directed against specific areas would be the necessity of adhering to a timetable dictated by factors as yet unknown. Such a factor would conceivably be the requirements of the Soviets. Unless such factors exist, the Communists will continue their present strategy through the summer in the form of continued sieges, raids, and the isolation and reduction of the outlying weak Nationalist garrisons.
6. If the Soviets plan military activity in the far east, the Chinese Communists will cooperate to the best of their ability.

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